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BOOK REVIEW CORNER

Ros Ballaster, Seductive Forms: Women's Amatory
Fiction from 1684 to 1740 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1992). Pp. iv + 232. $49.95.
Mona Scheuermann, Her Bread to Earn: Women,
Money, and Society from Defoe to Austen (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1993). Pp. xii + 284.
$29.00.
Reviewed by Alexander Pettit
University of North Texas
In Leo Damrosch's recent anthology, The Profession of
Eighteenth-Century Literature: Reflections on an Institution
(Madison, 1992), Donna Landry laments the collapse of a
cohesive feminist criticism born of a shared experience of
activism and uncontaminated by Francophilia, new historicism,
and other deviations characteristic of younger scholars unawed
by their forebears from the class of 1968. Although Ros
Ballaster works with a feminist tradition that Mona Scheuer
mann generally works against, recent studies by both critics
suggest how much the terrain has shifted: the old polarity of
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patriarchy and victim is of little use to scholars who would
rather explore than exploit gender relations in literary works.
Ballaster's subject is "women's amatory fiction," a subgenre
"explicitly erotic in its concentration on the representation of
sentimental love" (31). Her authors are Aphra Behn, Delarivier
Manley, and Eliza Haywood, who "dramatize the seduction of
the female reader by...exploring alternatives that offer models
for the female victim to come to 'mastery' of or resistance to
the fictional text through the figure of the heroinized female
writer" (30). Ballaster introduces her readings by explaining the
role of French fiction in shaping English constructions of a
female "reader," considered both literally (she who reads the
completed work) and figuratively (she whose intratextual
"readings" contribute to the work). Behn "repeatedly inscribes
herself into her tales of love, compulsively turning her reader's
gaze from the amorous couple to the amatory narrator, who
then uncannily retreats or withholds herself from view, in order
to set the pursuit in train again" (69). Here as elsewhere,
Ballaster argues against firm distinctions between fictional and
autobiographical "texts." Behn "seduces," but is not possessed
by, the hero of Oroonoko (1688); in this way she simultaneously
empowers the female writer by placing her at "the (erotic)
centre" of her own work, and authors a parallel dialogue of
unfulfilled desire between reader and work (98). Manley asserts
feminine power by introducing the female author (and her
heroines) into the male political sphere (123). The claim is not
assisted by Ballaster's willingness to make Manley more
politically prominent than she probably was. Her contention
that "Manley's political journalism is evidence of her impor
tance and instrumentality in Tory politics in the early
eighteenth century" (121) facilitates the coalescence of gender
and party politics that the argument needs, but hack writing did
not signify "instrumentality" even before Walpole and the
Hanoverians.
Ballaster finds Haywood unable to replicate "the ebullient
resilience of Behn's and Manley's narcissistic self-representa-
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tions" (169) and therefore given to creating heroines who assert
themselves erotically (thus narratively) only through hysterical
parodies of erotic experience or through the co-opting of
identity enabled by the masquerade motif prevalent in
Haywood's fiction. Heroines in this debased world are undone
by their inability to negotiate between "the [feminine] desire to
dilate the amatory plot (the desire of romance)" and "the
conflicting masculine desire of the libertine hero for closure (the
desire of the novel)" (179). This resonant conflation of gender
and genre prepares the reader for Ballaster's conclusion, a neatly
compressed discussion of amatory fiction as a source of
"negative precedents" for the sentimental novel (198).
Taking up chronologically about where Ballaster leaves off,
Scheuermann finds little support for the common notion that
the eighteenth-century English novel enforces the exclusion of
woman from dominant masculine culture. She aigues that "we
have come to think of women in these novels as essentially
sheltered from the world beyond their families, but this
perception simply does not stand up to scrutiny" (248). For
Scheuermann, the marker of woman's participation in society
is her skill in finance. She tests her thesis against Defoe,
Richardson, Henry Fielding, Hblcroft, Godwin, Bage, Inchbald,
Wollstonecraft, and Austen. The readings of Richardson,
Fielding, Godwin, and Wollstonecraft do not counter the
emphasis on female victimization for which Scheuermann faults
previous critics, but they succeed as reminders that victimiza
tion in the period is typically the suppression of a particular
(acknowledged) talent rather than the broad denial of merit.
Scheuermann is most deftly revisionist in her chapters on
Defoe and Richardson. Moll Flanders and Roxana become
proto-feminists who consistently oppose society's attempts to
victimize them. Scheuermann believes that Defoe's "antipaternalist perspective" (21) has been obscured by critics who focus
on the criminality of Defoe's heroines rather than on their
successful conversion of intellectual talent into capital. The
pointedly uncomplicated treatment of the gender dynamics of
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prostitution will irritate some readers; but Scheuermann—a
good polemicist as well as a good critic—no doubt intends it to.
The admiring tone of Scheuermann's discussion of Defoe
disappears in the chapter on Clarissa, the masterpiece of an
author who, Scheuermann believes, has done much to
encourage the victimization industry. By presenting Richardson
as less generous to women than Defoe, Scheuermann again
challenges feminist orthodoxy. "Richardson shows not only
that money does not give women power, but that it should
not," she ai^ues (78). Barred from the masculinist money
culture in which she is intellectually suited to participate,
Clarissa engages only in meaningless busy-work. Careful
readers will note that Scheuermann's targets include Christian
allegorists as well as left-leaning scholars. Scheuermann's dislike
of ideologically totalizing generalizations about the novel is
evident in this "feminist" but non-doctrinaire chapter, as it is in
her unapologetic use of the truisms of earlier feminism in her
discussions of Fielding, whose women she finds either "meanly
virtuous," "fallen," or paragonal (106), and Wollstonecraft,
whose strident sense of female victimage she accepts.
In her excellent conclusion, Scheuermann uses the prenuptial
letters of Mary Pierrepont and Edward Wortley Montagu to
illustrate the period's melding of romance and finance. If earlier
"amatory fiction" offered women the possibility of "textual"
power through the subversion of phallic telos, later fictive reenactments of negotiations such as Pierrepont's and Montagu's
suggest that women who had control over their own money
could hope for a less abstract sort of power, if not one often
realized outside of fiction.
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Joanne Cutting-Gray, Woman as "Nohody" and the
Novels of Fanny Burney (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 1992). Pp. 169. $24.95.
Reviewed by Catherine Craft-Fairchild
University of St. Thomas
In Joanne Cutting-Gray's Woman as "Nobody", the works of
Fanny Burney are subjected to the scrutiny of a fully post
modern sensibility. Using as her point of departure Burney's
well-known journal entry, Cutting-Gray argues for a reconsid
eration of "those 'unspeakable' points of crisis in...[Burney's]
novels. Cecilia's madness, Camilla's sickness, even Evelina's
anguish over the purloined letter cry out for us to reconsider
woman's hysteria as belonging to the crucial issue of namelessness" (84). "Why a female must be made Nobody," writes
Cutting-Gray, "is a question Burney raises" in each of her
works (109). By raising the question, Cutting-Gray insists,
Burney dismantles conventional notions of authority and opens
possibilities for her heroine's self-creation and self-determina
tion.
Woman as "Nobody" succumbs to two of the principal evils
that typically attend poststructuralist readings:
a highly
specialized vocabulary that renders many sentences unintelligi
ble for the uninitiated and a privileging of theory that calls into
question historical accuracy. The text is laced with sentences
like the following;
Writing her journal-letters will liberate Evelina from the
alienating self-consciousness that divides her from herself;
it will release her to the company of the two-in-one of
thought...the generative power of naming...multiplies the
company of Evelina within the free play of writing.
(11-12)
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Elsewhere in the same chapter, Cutting-Gray asserts, "When
Willoughby purloins Evelina's letter, he is only the most
outrageous (and hence useful) instance of a social order that in
speaking for her, in owning the signs that signify her, in using
namelessness as a sign of woman as currency, purloins her
letter" (22). About Camilla, she writes, "To make her into an
object disrupts her integrity as a provisional subject (not
properly a subject at all) and obscures her as female, mystifying
her into an object (not properly an object)" (76).
In addition to piling up clauses of the obligatory jaig;on,
Cutting-Gray, as a good postmodernist, affirms the death of the
author:
Since "A Certain Miss Nobody" is also the author of the
diary, Burney dismantles the notion of author as an
original source or an individual preceding a text.
"Nobody" replaces "author," and converts the entity
"Fanny Burney" into a multivoiced community. Thus,
Nobody is neither historical personage, Frances D'Arblay,
. nor author Frances Burney, but a conversational inven
tion that produces subjectivity between the various
names.
The closing chapter...places Burney's view of Woman
alongside those of Kristeva, Lyotard, Arendt, and Irigaray.
(7)
As an '"author function,' a multivoiced community that
constitutes discourse" (110), Burney can enter directly into
dialogue with twentieth-century critics just as easily as she can
converse with the likes of Dr. Johnson and Mrs. Thrale. The
privileging of theory in Woman as "Nobody" risks the loss of
any sense of historical specificity—though, indeed, Cut
ting-Gray seems at times to resuscitate the dead author in
peculiar ways. Although Burney is entombed, she remains alive
enough to write with feminist intentions. Cutting-Gray asserts:
"What had once been seen as narrative weaknesses in Burney's
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writing can now be understood as an experimental project that
avoids the mutual determination of patriarchy and antipatriarchy" (4). Do multivoiced communities launch projects?
It is in uncovering those places where "Nobody-Burney...the
author function" (129) seems to do so that Cutting-Gray is at
her weakest.
Where Cutting-Gray is at her best is in her readings of the
novels. The reader who remains undaunted by the jargon and
the ahistoricism will find that Woman as "Nobody" raises
interesting and important questions about the works it
discusses. Cutting-Gray pinpoints with great accuracy the
essential contradictions within each of Burney's novels. How
is Evelina to "expand her experience...without the loss of her
intrinsic, encapsulated innocence" (12)? Why does the Evelina
who writes reveal "a much more evaluative knowledge of her
world than the Evelina she writes about" (18)? Why do Cecilia
and Camilla "resort to indirect means, gaps in the public
discourse, fits of madness, sickness near to death, and exhibi
tions of emotion in order to be heard and understood" (31)?
To address the last question, Cutting-Gray identifies the
essential opposition between Cecilia and Camilla: "Where
Cecilia believes that reason stands in the place of her desire,
Camilla believes that affectivity stands in the place of her
reason" (78). After her clandestine marriage, Cecilia "can
neither declare her feelings nor assert her desires; she can
neither act upon her reason nor accept the strength of her
passion. In adopting the dominant mode of reason she submits
to an absolute rectitude antithetical to feeling. 'Sanity of mind,'
her highest principle, prevents her from forgiving herself (39).
In Camilla, "the essential tension...arises when a character of
'melting sensibility' who rejects the rational falls in love with
a 'watcher' without trust who grafts desire on the very
affectivity that his notion of the rational denies" (54). What
Edgar "most admires in Camilla is also what he heartily
disapproves"; in turn, Camilla "must appear interested in Edgar
in order to encourage his declaration, yet also disinterested [sic]
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in order to prevent his disapprobation" and must communicate
this "complexity of interest and disinterest [sic]" solely through
"her silent behavior" (63-4). Is it any wonder that Cecilia goes
mad or that Camilla falls ill.'
Finally, however, after analyzing the speaking anguish of
Burney's heroines, Cutting-Gray arrives at a conclusion about
their nobody-ness that remains non-persuasive. Literalizing
Irigaray's assertion that women speak through the "blanks in
discourse," Cutting-Gray finds Juliet in Burney's The Wanderer
to be the epitome of a character articulate in silence and
powerful through namelessness: "Far from constituting a
woman as a named, passive object, namelessness discloses her as
a human agent....Juliet shows us that silence itself is a special
mode of speaking and being heard" (85, 102). Cutting-Gray
herself admits that this looks a lot like traditional femininity:
"What follows will seem, in terms of traditional categories, to
be a return, with little or no difference, to the stereotyped
passivity of the feminine" (98). She goes on to assert, however,
that "in order to see The Wanderer as other than 'female
difficulties,' the antinomic thinking which privileges aggressive
action and denies nonaction as passivity must be dismantled"
(85). While this sounds good in theory, in practice it is difficult
to locate "the power of Juliet's silence and inaction" (92), or to
know why "Juliet's understanding of the dialectic within
passivity...prevents her from falling into the role of unwitting
victim" (94), or, finally, to accept that "in acting on behalf of
others she is acting on behalf of who she is" (103). Juliet's lack
of a name does not allow her to name herself—those around
her, as Cutting-Gray points out, title her as they please until
two men, her brother and suitor, bestow upon her the names
she will retain. To insist upon the positive potentiality of
Juliet's namelessness is to offer a rather rosy view of the
predicaments that form the substance, and the subtitle, of
Burney's last novel.
While Woman as "Nobody" offers theoretically informed
readings of Burney's novels that ask the right questions about
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the self-negations of her central female characters, many readers
will want to test Cutting-Gray's answers against the work of
more historically grounded Burney scholars such as Patricia
Meyer Spacks, Kristina Straub, Margaret Anne Doody, and Julia
Epstein.

Jean I. Marsden, ed., The Appropriation of Shakes
peare: Post-Renaissance Reconstructions of the Works
and the Myth (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
Pp. vi + 222. $39.95.
Reviewed by Stephen Bretzius
Louisiana State University
Shakespeare's reception has long been a topic of critical
reflection, but in recent years the subject has enjoyed an almost
predictable critical renaissance. For whether Shakespeare's plays
were intended to serve decidedly royalist or subversively
countercultural ends, an examination of the issue of reception
brings together the literary and the political in ways immedi
ately resonant with much recent ideological criticism. In the
Introduction to The Appropriation of Shakespeare: PostRenaissance Reconstructions of the Works and the Myth, Jean
Marsden asserts that "the essays in this volume break new
ground by considering many of the political and cultural issues
raised" by Shakespeare's post-Renaissance literary and cultural
reception. The twelve essays that follow—several interesting, a
few anecdotal, and two with little or no bearing on the
subject—present both the insights and the shortcomings of
much recent work on Shakespeare's influence and reception.
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The Appropriation of Shakespeare begins with Michael
Dobson's provocative account of the way Julius Caesar
strategically furthered both rightist and leftist Enlightenment
agendas even as Shakespeare's own ghostly apotheosis as
England's national spirit ultimately casts the Bard himself in the
role of Caesar. Citing Lewis Theobald's prologue to a 1738
revival of Hamlet at Covent Garden—"Immortal Shakespeare] we
thy claim admit; / For, like thy Caesar, thou art mighty yet\ /
Thy spirit walks abroad-, and at our hands / Thy honorary tomb,
thy right, demands"—Dobson remarks: "whether Julius Caesar
was claimed as symbol of the past glories of the English
monarchy or the past flowering of English liberty, tinged with
Jacobite nostalgia or Whig, Shakespeare's concomitant
promotion to the status of Author—immortal, disembodied
spirit of his texts—was carried out in large part in the image of
the most successfully disembodied spirit in Julius Caesar" (24).
Here, Shakespeare's appropriation is political through and
through, and neoclassical Parliamentary politics, still more
suggestively, radically Shakespearean.
A similar critical
emphasis characterizes the second essay, Nancy Quine
Maguire's "Nahum Tate's King Lear. 'the king's blest
restoration,"' which explores the loyalist agendas underwriting
Tate's 1681 rewriting in ways that underscore important
ideological dimensions of the entire revisionist project.
Among the most persuasive of the remaining contributions,
Nicola J. Watson's "Kemble, Scott, and the Mantle of the Bard"
sets out Shakespeare's importance for John Philip Kemble and
Sir Walter Scott "in the counter-revolutionary [and postBurkean] reformulation of cultural identity carried out at the
turn of the nineteenth century" (74), culminating in Scott's own
proto-Joycean attempts to authorize himself as "the Shakespeare
of novelists" (73). Howard Felperin's "Bardolatry, Then and
Now" juxtaposes late nineteenth-century Shakespeare societies
(and bizarre authorship debates) with the postwar critical
investment in the poetry and plays.
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In other essays, Marsden's "Rewritten Women: Shakespear
ean Heroines in the Restoration" maps various neoclassical
revisions onto the changing female stereotypes addressed in
courtesy books and other contemporary writing. Margreta de
Grazia's "Shakespeare in Quotation Marks" charts the growing
popularity of eighteenth-century books of Shakespearean
quotations. John Glavin reads the nineteenth-century "prosing
of Juliet" by Wilde and others against a changing Victorian
sensibility. Hugh Grady's "Disintegration and Its Reverbera
tions" considers the relationship between culture, alienation,
and late Victorian editorial attempts to fix the Shakespearean
canon. Bryan Loughrey and Graham Holderness unfold the
role of Shakespeare's visual likeness in legitimating Shake
speare's work. Marjorie Garber addresses cross-dressing. In the
concluding essay, Ann Thompson chronicles various directorial
approaches to the convoluted last scenes of Cymbeline.
The essays comprising The Appropriation of Shakespeare thus
variously catalogue the formal, historical, and psychological
dimensions of Shakespeare's post-Renaissance fortunes. None,
however, asks why or how Shakespeare's plays and poetry exert
such a permanent, wide-ranging, and deeply central cultural and
political influence. Dobson's essay, for example, describes how
Julius Caesar comes to represent the archetypal Shakespearean
"appropriation," autobiographically restaging Shakespeare's own
Caesarean claims on a properly literary history. But one
wonders what qualities of Julius Caesar—and of Shakespeare's
plays and poetry generally—make it the proleptic story of its
own posthumous cultural imperialism, recasting Shakespeare's
ghost in Caesar's. When Ben Jonson, in his 1619 Timber, pokes
fun at Shakespeare's possibly revised "Caesar did never wrong,
but with just cause," why is Shakespeare's own "wrong" already
compounded with Caesar's.^ And when Ringo Starr is
introduced on the Beatles' album SgL Pepper's Lonely Hearts
Club Band as "the one and only Billy Shears," who somewhat
defensively returns to Julius Caesar with "lend me your ears and
I'll sing you a song," why is Billy Shears (turned William
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Shakespeare) the lead singer on the most representative album
in postwar popular music?
Here only one play, and only one extremely nuanced facet
of its post-Renaissance reception (Shakespeare's relation to
Caesar, criticism or appropriation's relation to the cult violence
of Shakespearean "brothers"), occasions a host of formal,
institutional, and ideological questions. Too often, however,
the work of reception theory, as exhibited in The Appropriation
of Shakespeare, is more descriptive than speculative.

Kenneth Craven, Jonathan Swift and the Millenium
of Madness: The Information Age in Swift's "A Tale
of a Tub" (Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill,
Studies in Intellectual History 30, 1992). Pp. 238.
$68.57.
Reviewed by Clive Probyn
Monash University, Victoria, Australia
The argument is circular. Craven's thesis is that Swift, both
in his own lifetime and in ours, challenges the "scientific
millenarian myth enmeshed in [his and] our modern informa
tion systems," that myth being an optimistic faith in linear
human progress. The archetype that comprehends this
challenge is defined here as the "Kronos-Saturn" complex, a
kind of philosophic skepticism and melancholic pessimism that,
in Swift's case, operated within and through satire (primarily
but not exclusively in A Tale) and against a vast and complex
tradition. In Craven's reading, twentieth-century epistemological, cultural, scientific, and psychological crossroads meet in the
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work of Swift, and, more particularly, through his dealings
(directly or through a chain of associations) with a series of key
figures.
The targets of Swift and the subjects of Craven's eight
chapters are the "priest-bating" deist John Toland {Christianity
Not Mysterious, 1695); Narcissus Marsh (Archbishop of Dublin
and logician, and in both capacities Swift's bete noire); John
Browne (Provost at Trinity) who, with Marsh, comprised the
"left and right wings of the Modern world" in Dublin (44); the
revolutionary republican Milton (satirized "at every turn in the
Tale," [76]); Shaftesbury and his benevolist philosophy; the
political theory of Harrington's The Oceana (1656); Sir William
Temple (Swift's own mentor, employer, model, and intellectual
inferior); and what Craven calls the "millenial mechanics" of
Newton. Paracelsus broods throughout, and I suspect that the
last major text to be discussed, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies
in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art (edited by
Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, 1965), is the origin of this broadranging, passionate, confusing, messianic, hortatory, and in
some ways revisionary study.
Chapter one is more of an obstacle race than a pathway into
the book, and there is what I take to be a nudge and a wink in
the gesture of superior and confidential irony here, together
with a hectoring insistence that nobody until now has managed
to penetrate the hermeneutical and proleptic deceptions of the
canny Swift. Experienced readers of Swift will be responding
already with skepticism to such claims for another Key to All
Mythologies. There is more to overleap: Craven is unpardonably insistent on our seeing the parallel (or is it identity.?)
between the ground of Swift's cultural satire and the rationale
of "modern information delivery systems." The proposition is
that the reader of A Tale is "confronted with three major issues
in late twentieth-century information science—content
formatting, data priority, and rapid delivery" (11). This may
well be Craven's particular professional interest (and mean
much to the systems analyst), but this attempt to show Swift's
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prophetic diagnosis of our own "modernity" results in crude
and mechanistic oversimplifications of both Swift and our own
information culture. There is also some dubious argumentative
method. On page 16, for example, we read that we can now
escape from the "idiosyncratic conjectures of confounded
critics" because the Tale's discourse coincides with "the
recognizable correlation of a future time for its [long-awaited]
unraveling." The concepts "overt" and "covert," like the
matters of presence and influence, seem interchangeable and
even synonymous: in A Tale, although Toland is Swift's "major
satiric victim" (5), he appears only "covertly" (111); Marsh, too,
is "a major satiric victim" (10); Browne, writing in 1697, "has
fallen into Swift's trap" in 1704 (47). Craven's misleading habit
of re-writing quotations (interpolating specific names where no
specificity exists, prefacing the addition with "i.e.," as on page
51), indicates his determination to pull everything into the orbit
of Swift—as when Craven insinuates that Swift learned the
Provost's Logic "At Marsh's feet" [53]). The first six pages of the
Milton chapter are very confusing, where interpretations slide
into facts (65), and quotations "make clear" only what Craven
wishes to see in them, not what their authors actually say
(65-6). The Tale "alludes to Milton throughout" on page 66,
and by page 220 it "mocks Milton throughout" through words
such as "title," "haply," "undergo," "trial" and "purgatory" (66),
words that, as far as I am aware, have never enjoyed Miltonic
property rights. There are many slippages in ai^ument, typified
by the claim (90) that Louis Landa notes that Swift's sermon
On the Testimony of Conscience "argues specifically with
Shaftesbury's 1711 Characteristics including the Inquiry." The
quotation Craven himself provides demonstrates that Landa
does nothing of the kind, although one can easily see why mere
fact should not be allowed to weigh too heavily in such an
argument, because both Swift and Shaftesbury "each [deliver]
private messages and ripostes to the other that are usually over
the heads of their readers" (101). Readers familiar with A Tale
will know whom they will meet in that space that exists over
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the heads of their audience. And there are too many typo
graphical errors.
There are better things in this study than its problematical
narrative method, its slippery notions of proof, causation,
intention, influence, chronology, and its conversion of Swift
into a universal signifier of all things prescient and admirable.
At the center of the book there is a potent argument capable of
clear definition: "[Swift] is a keen observer and analyst of a
society whose institutions in church, learning, and state are
moving away from the blind and arbitrary authority of the past
towards an optimistic, new world with its own forms of
blindness and arrogance" (206). Another way of describing this
process is to animate it: thus, on page 198, there is this: "Swift
modulates from the Paracelsian-Rosicrucian-Miltonian-Tolandic
mystery of a New Eden to his own reading of the seventeenthcentury reformation as a Galenic humoral imbalance in modern
learning, the phenomenon of vapours, a new madness, a new
darkness, a new chaos passed off as inner illumination, the
divine inspiration vouchsafed to modern man by the Reforma
tion." Putting aside the question of how much of Swift's
interpretation was unique or appropriated from other sources,
the difference between these two statements is profound: the
latter submerges human will and reifies intentionality into the
arena of intellectual history. Although it is Craven's stated
desire to construct a Swift who is part of the grand sweep of
intellectual ideas, the effect is the reverse of this: Swift sits in
the elevated center, as source and destination, as chief player
and umpire, as jury and judge, plainant and arbiter—like the
true believers in his own poem "The Place of the Damn'd"
(1731), for whom Hell is neither at Paris nor Rome, and most
especially not "at Home."
Craven's is one of those difficult and learned books that is
oddly comforting to read: intellectual history is explained
through a series of linked personalities (authors and their books
coalesce and neatly arrange themselves in a chain of causal
circumstances, as they do in Swift's own The Battle of the
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Books)-, and through a single frame of reference (the vague and
largely unfamiliar Saturn-Kronos theory) we appear to gain
access to truths hidden for centuries from the less perceptive.
This is the hermeneutics of suspicion, a curious conclusion
about a writer whose own attachment to commonplace wisdom
and hostility to unquiet critical souls ("dark Authors") was so
fierce. But the comfortable sense of inclusion within an elite of
intelligent readers is illusory in two ways, one of which Craven
acknowledges: we (post)Moderns, like the Moderns of the early
eighteenth-century, are specially privileged in being able to
understand Swift because we are cursed by the same cultural
disasters and false gods (scientific millenarianism, information
overload, the death of the soul). Yet Craven sells us short in
one respect: that intense sense of self-implication (or implica
tion of the selves) in Swift's writing is the reverse of Olympian,
and while there is nothing wrong in imagining that Swift saw
more clearly than anybody else in his period the folly of
millenarianism, the reason we still read him has, I suspect, less
to do with what or whom he attacked and more to do with the
brilliance of his perception, right and wrong.

Liana Vardi, The Land and the Loom: Peasants and
Profit in Northern France, 1680-1800 (Durham:
Duke University Press, 1993). Pp. 297. $34.95.
Reviewed by Mary Kimbrough
Texas Southern University
Judging from its title alone, one might dismiss this book as
still another dull study of land use and the development of
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cottage industry in a geographically restricted area. That would
be a mistake. Professor Vardi richly describes how the
Cambresis peasants forthrightly responded to the challenges
nature had placed upon them and how they took economic
advantage of the new opportunities offered by weaving linen
textiles and selling them at home or in a variety of foreign
markets. Although she applies the findings of her meticulous
research in the archives of the Departement du Nord primarily
to the village of Montigny, she also includes neighboring
villages of Cambresis in order to indicate differing conditions
such as soil quality, population, and financial dealings in the
120-year period under scrutiny. Indeed, she at time goes
beyond her terminus post quern to inform the reader of the
results of industrialization once it came to this linen-weaving
area in the mid-nineteenth century.
The first part of the book is devoted to the land, the
methods of farming it, the preferred crops, and the size of
individual holdings. The author also explains how the peasant
leaseholders bargained, usually successfully, with the seigneurs
for a fair rental when the latter were compelled to raise their
usually reasonable dues because of inflation. Other statistics,
always well explained, set out land prices, ownership, types of
soil, and the relative wealth of the leaseholders according to the
amount of taxes they paid. Professor Vardi discusses improve
ments in agriculture over the century, stating that they came
about mainly by plowing and harrowing the soil more
frequently than the usual three times for each operation at the
beginning of the period. By 1790 it appears that Cambresis as
a whole had been able to abandon the wasteful triennial
rotation of crops. Greater yields, naturally, were able to
support a greater population.
The extra income generated from linen-weaving also was a
factor in the growth of rural Cambresis, a region of Flanders
where weaving had begun in urban centers in the fourteenth
century. Weaving came to the rural areas from towns such as
Cambrai mainly because of too-stringent guild regulations.
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Village weavers were paid 10 to 20 percent less than city
workers, and linen-weaving, because of the brittleness of linen
thread, resisted mechanization until the mid-nineteenth century,
thtis providing work for growing numbers in the countryside.
It is instructive to see how Montigny's population continued to
increase, expanding from 283 inhabitants in 1709 to 605 in
1790, reaching a high of 1223 inhabitants in 1884, then falling
to 685 in 1975. The percentage of weavers in Montigny
expanded from 17.5 in 1686 to 62 percent in 1787. Neverthe
less, it seems that there was no strong correlation between the
number of weavers and a village's soil fertility or the size of
peasant leaseholds; that number seems to have depended more
upon the entrepreneurial initiative of the individual. In
describing how some set themselves up early as middlemen for
the finished product. Professor Vardi presents an especially
varied tapestry of peasant activity. Some were content to
remain weavers, some developed credit mechanisms and acted
as traders between the village artisans and town wholesalers,
and some even became linen merchants on their own, traveling
abroad or entering into clandestine arrangements with foreign
dealers in order to avoid high duties on the finished cloth.
One minor flaw in this tapestry is worth remarking: In her
discussion of the various grades of linen cloth. Professor Vardi
uses French terminology when it seems that English would do
better. There were three principal grades of textiles made from
flax, the finest being batiste, the name common to both
languages. The middle grade she calls linon, which might be
more clearly rendered as "cambric" in English, and the loosest
weave she calls gaze, the English "gauze." The author does,
however, provide a clear description of the weaving process
itself, and for the standards for the three types of linen and
their intermediary grades.
Among the many excellent qualities of The Land and the
Loom is the thoroughness and clarity of the technical aspects of
the topic—farming implements, the evolution of credit modes,
and the mechanics of weaving itself. No less clear are the
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logical explanations of why the peasants bought and sold land.
Professor Vardi paints a picture of the peasant closely in tune
with his own village and with the wider world. She provides
a welcome corrective to the stereotype of the downtrodden
class so overwhelmed by taxes and feudal dues that its members
are barely human (La Bruyere), or to the Arcadian view that
those who till the land are closer to nature and therefore
neither so degenerate nor depraved as their artificial and
sophisticated city cousins. This study describes peasant life
much as it must have been, with the more ambitious buying
and selling land for their own advantage, some taking up
weaving merely to supplement family income, and others who
lost out altogether. Some were able to rebuild their fortunes,
whereas others moved to different communities. The family
names that keep coming up in various transactions as the
generations succeed each other lend solidity and texture to this
worthwhile and riveting study. Professor Vardi's conclusions
prove valid, I am sure, for other regions of France.
The peasantry has traditionally been the least accurately
portrayed stratum of French society; Liana Vardi's book is a
welcome contribution in rectifying that situation.
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Conor Cruise O'Brien, The Great Melody. A
Thematic Biography of Edmund Burke (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1992). Pp. Ixxv + 692.
$34.95.
Reviewed by David Venturo
Clark University
Conor Cruise O'Brien's The Great Melody: A Thematic
Biography of Edmund Burke marks the culmination of an
eminent author's long interest in Burke and is a major
contribution to Burke scholarship. Although the book
examines at length Burke's political career, it is not a traditional
chronological biography. Instead, O'Brien himself describes it
as a "thematic biography," that theme being Burke's lifelong
effort to curb the abuse of governmental power, reflected in
Burke's parliamentary efforts on behalf of Irish Catholics,
American colonists, the people of India, and victims of the
French Revolution. O'Brien encapsulates that theme in the
phrase, "the Great Melody," which he borrows from W. B.
Yeats's poem, "The Seven Sages" (1933): "American colonies,
Ireland, France and India / Harried, and Burke's great melody
against it" (11. 15-16).
O'Brien's biography participates in the historiographical
reaction against the historical school of Sir Lewis Namier
(1888-1960), who scoffed at the notion that the political
writings of such eighteenth-century figures as Henry St. John,
Viscount Bolingbroke, and Edmund Burke should be taken
seriously. Because Namier believed that ideologically informed
political parties came into being only in the nineteenth century,
he dismissed the writings of Bolingbroke and Burke as mere
self-interested "cant" and focused his attention instead on the
quantifiable records of eighteenth-century parliamentary roll
calls. O'Brien follows in the tradition of such scholars as the
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historians J. G. A. Pocock and Isaac Kramnick and the political
scientist Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., in his attempt to restore
Burke's reputation as a major political figure whose career, like
Bolingbroke's, was crucial to the formation of modern political
parties in Britain.
O'Brien accounts for the origin of Burke's "Great Melody"
against abuse of governmental power in psycho-biographical
terms. According to O'Brien, not only was Burke's matrilineage Roman Catholic (a fact accepted by all Burke scholars) but
his patrilineage as well. O'Brien makes a good case based on
circumstantial evidence that Burke's father was born a Roman
Catholic but became a communicant of the Church of Ireland
in order to pursue a career as an attorney, under the pressure
of the Irish Penal Laws. That Burke sprang from HibernoNorman Catholic stock on both sides of his family, and that
Burke's mother, his maternal cousins, his sister, and wife were
all practicing Roman Catholics, accounts nicely for the origin
of Burke's lifelong sympathy for people whose native customs
and practices were routinely interfered with by government fiat.
O'Brien weakens his argument, however, by indulging in
fanciful psychological speculation that Burke's efforts against
such oppression resulted from a deeply personal need to atone
for his father's religious apostasy (84-5), and that Burke felt
"corrupted" and "infected" by Richard Burke's conversion (82).
Such arguments, based on the absence of any positive and
substantial evidence, are prima facie suspect, rather like the
argument that springs up in literary circles from time to time
that Shakespeare was a crypto-Catholic.
When O'Brien does not indulge in such speculative
psychologizing, his book is quite splendid. He convincingly
demonstrates that, far from the Namierian image of Burke as a
toady to his aristocratic superiors. Burke played a central role
in defining the Rockingham Whigs's opposition to Lord
North's and George IH's American policy in the 1770s and
1780s. After 1778, it was Burke, according to O'Brien, who
kept the Marquess of Rockingham steady in his insistence that
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the British had to accept American demands for independence.
Indeed, O'Brien insists that, from 1778 to 1782, the "parlia
mentary struggle over America consisted essentially of a battle
of wills between George III and Edmund Burke" (202). O'Brien
argues that Burke played an equally prominent role in defining
the India policy of the Foxite Whigs in the 1780s. Although
the 1783 bill to end the autonomy of the East India Company
was nominally Charles James Fox's, its moral author was
Burke. Burke was also the driving force behind the impeach
ment of Warren Hastings, the governor-general of the East
India Company and de facto ruler of much of India.
O'Brien's account of Burke's attempt to hold Hastings
accountable for the vicious cruelty and rapacious fortunehunting that went on in eastern India under Hastings's watch
makes for engrossing reading. O'Brien vividly describes how
Burke was able to transcend party lines by persuading the Tory
Prime Minister, young William Pitt, to vote for impeachment.
He also brings to life the unlikely friendship that developed
between Burke and Philip Francis, the putative author of the
Junius letters, as these two men collaborated on Hastings's
impeachment.
In dealing with Burke on the French Revolution, O'Brien
emphasizes Burke's almost prophetic grasp of the situation.
Reflections on the Revolution in France shows that Burke was
convinced that the French Revolution would lead to regicide,
a reign of terror, and military rule years before these events
actually took place. O'Brien also absolves Burke of charges of
philosophical inconsistency over his break with the Foxite
Whigs on the subject of France in 1791. O'Brien does so by
showing how from the start to the finish of his public career.
Burke consistently defended peoples' customary rites and
practices from the intrusion of social theorists, enthusiasts, and
ideologues.
The chief shortcoming of O'Brien's book results from the
sheer magnitude of Edmund Burke's achievement.
By
concentrating on the theme of the "Great Melody," O'Brien
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elects not to address the enormous range of Burke's intellectual
interests. Burke was the author of the pioneering aesthetic
treatise, A Philosophical Enquiry into Our Ideas of the Sublime
and Beautiful, the editor and, later, a contributor to the Annual
Register, an important contemporary historical annual, and one
of the few intellectual equals in England of his friend Samuel
Johnson. Unfortunately, O'Brien says little about these facets
of Burke's life. In addition, the personality of O'Brien's Burke
is not vividly drawn. Granted, Burke was a deeply private
man, sensitive to intrusions on his personal life, and careful of
what he revealed to those outside his family and close friends.
Still, one gets a better sense of the richness and complexity of
Burke's character from Paul Fussell's brief biographical sketch
of Burke in the Tillotson, Fussell, and Waingrow anthology,
Eighteenth-Century English Literature, than from The Great
Melody because Fussell is less protective of Burke and therefore
more willing to address both his virtues and faults. Last of all,
O'Brien has a tendency to make Burke into a modern defender
of human rights, when Burke's defense of the Indians,
Americans, Irish, and French is predicated instead on a respect
for local, historical custom or common law, similar to that of
the seventeenth-century jurist. Sir Matthew Hale.
These reservations notwithstanding, Conor Cruise O'Brien's
thematic biography constitutes a major achievement. Accessible
to layman and scholar alike, it is the best book on Burke since
the publication of Carl B. Cone's Burke and the Nature of
Politics and Harvey C. Mansfield's, Jr.'s, Statesmanship and Party
Government a generation ago.
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Hugh Trevor-Roper, From Counter-Revolution to
Glorious Revolution (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992). Pp. 348. $29.95
Reviewed by Deborah Jacobs
Prestonsburg Community College
From Counter-Revolution to Glorious Revolution continues
Hugh Trevor-Roper's masterful series of essays on the religiopolitical culture of seventeenth-century England. Other
volumes in this series include Renaissance Essays and Catholics,
Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays. The latest
volume in the series includes fifteen essays on a variety of
topics, from "Medicine at the Early Stuart Court" and "The
Plunder of the Arts in the Seventeenth Century" to "The
Anglo-Scottish Union."
Other essays provide in-depth
discussion and cogent analyses of seventeenth-century
personalities such as Matteo Ricci and Hugo Grotius. The
volume also includes biographical essays, analyses of events in
the lives of seventeenth-century clerics and statesmen such as
Matthew Wren, William Laud, Clarendon, and Prince Rupert.
These essays aid both the novice researcher and the
accomplished seventeenth-century scholar in appreciating the
blurring of the lines between church and state that so strikingly
characterizes seventeenth-century England. In From CounterRevolution to Glorious Revolution, Hugh Tevor-Roper, an
undisputed master of both the historical essay and of seven
teenth-century England, demonstrates with verve and aplomb
that the historical essay can be simultaneously challenging,
enlightening, and thoroughly entertaining.
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Patrick Brady, Rococo Poetry, in English, French,
German, Italian: An Introduction (Knoxville,
Tennessee: New Paradigm Press, 1992). Pp. 114.
$12.
Reviewed by William Park
Sarah Lawrence College
Patrick Brady's Rococo Poetry serves as an introduction to a
forthcoming multi-volume anthology of almost six hundred
rococo poems in four different languages, dating roughly from
1660 to 1770. Such a useful and comparative work represents
great erudition and perseverance and should be applauded. Not
the least valuable part of the introduction is the first chapter,
"Previous Assessments," in which Brady reviews the history of
the concept of rococo as it applies to poetry. In subsequent
chapters he outlines and illustrates various themes or attitudes
that comprise this body of work, such as love as play;
inconstancy; an emphasis on the visual; the female body; the
rites of the toilette; pet birds and animals; the delights of city
life; and ancient and modern models. He then concludes with
a chapter, "The Poetics of Reduction," which offers a brief and
somewhat critical assessment of the Age of Rococo. Particu
larly, he disputes the so-called "Reign of Women" during this
period and points out the negative view of women contained in
the poetry. The "general impoverishment of emotional life in
this society" (85) he attributes to the "dilution of the
metaphorical dimension" (88), which is to say of the "preceding
baroque world-view." This loss of "vertical transcendence"
results in a horizontal "compensatory euphemization of the
here and now" (89).
While one must praise Brady for his knowledge and for his
contributions to rococo studies, one may also question his
concept of the rococo. Brady sees himself as steering a difficult
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course between Scylla and Ghaiybdis. On the one hand, he
deplores the "monolithic fallacy" that makes every aspect of a
slice of time rococo, and on the other, the "recurrent" view
which sees Anacreontic hedonism as a timeless phenomenon (7).
Thus here and in his other writings, he tends to see the rococo
as a style of a period, not as a period style, and he attempts to
confine the use of rococo to only the purest examples. By so
doing Brady puts himself in a double bind. If he rigorously
limits the designation "rococo," he inevitably finds the style
trivial or reductive. But if he extends the term to include
works that, to some degree, share the rococo aesthetic, then he
drifts into the fallacy he most despises, for very few works of
the first half of the eighteenth century, as Minguet pointed out,
are free of rococo traces. Thus Brady himself refers to this era
as the "rococo period," the time when the "characteristically
visual, playful, and frothily voluptuous hedonism of rococo
society" (6) was predominant. If it was predominant, then how
does it affect works with baroque or romantic tendencies? . If
The Rape of the Lock is the "greatest masterpiece" (9) of rococo
poetry, then rococo poetry concerns itself not only with
manners and the toilette, but also with morality, mortality, the
relationship of art to life, and the burning issues of gender and
class. If Pope and Gay were rococo, then so, too, was their
friend Swift, who wrote about all the themes mentioned by
Brady, though satirically and scatologically. The more Brady
draws fast lines between one poem or one poet and another, the
more arbitrary and contradictory he becomes. Happily, his
best insights occur not when he is denying rococo status to
various works, but when he expands into general remarks about
the nature and structure of the rococo. When, for instance,
Brady discusses a "culture's elimination of the metaphorical and
substitution of (reduction to) the metonymic" (88), he
demonstrates just how frothy hedonism impinges on the most
serious works of the rococo period.
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William Park, The Idea of Rococo (Cranbury:
University of Delaware Press, 1993). Pp. 138. $55.
Reviewed by Patrick Brady
University of Tennessee
This attractive volume will delight the cofiFee-table set, and
rightly so: it is beautifully illustrated, if a little expensive.
Moreover, the author is knowledgeable and loves the rococo.
Unfortunately, the positions he takes are familiar—one looks in
vain for new methods or new insights—and largely discredited
because they are tainted by the monolithic fallacy that marred
the work of Helmut Hatzfeld and Roger Laufer. Modern
scholarship on the rococo has gone far beyond these concep
tions of thirty years ago, both methodologically and textually
(see, for example, Jean Weisgerber's brilliant Les Masques fragiles:
Esthetique et formes de la litterature rococo [Lausanne: L'Age
d'Homme, 1991]). Furthermore, the understanding of the
French contribution to the rococo, a style that is crucially and
centrally French, is quite inadequate, resulting in inappropriate
criteria for this style.
Park calls the rococo "the last phase of the baroque," the
first phase of the Enlightenment, and "the commencement of
romanticism and modernism" (111), thus everything becomes
indistinguishable from everything else. Taking this attitude to
its logical conclusion, he enrolls in the rococo "virtually the
present-day canon of English works of the first half of the
eighteenth century" (89)—Swift, Sterne, Richardson, tutti quanti.
Like Laufer, whom he resembles in confusing the rococo with
the Enlightenment, he also tries to enroll in the rococo most of
the significant French novels of that period—not only La Vie de
Marianne but also Lettres persanes, Manon Lescaut, Candide.
When the rococo is treated this way, it becomes virtually
meaningless as an aesthetic term, being reduced to a name given
to a period irrespective of the widely varying aesthetic
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characteristics of the works produced in that period, as
evidenced, for example, by Manon Lescaut and La Vie de
Marianne. To enroll these two novels under the same concept
is to make of it merely a period concept, instead of a period
style concept.
Quoting Edward Lowinsky as saying "Royal entertainment
demands ceremony and dignity; middle class entertainment
echoes the brisk pace of everyday life" (85), Park comments:
"To him, baroque is aristocratic, rococo middle class," but
Lowinsky says "royal," not "aristocratic"—Park confuses the
royal taste of the court with the (often very different) taste of
the aristocracy. He agrees with what he thinks Lowinsky is
saying: "The rococo, which is sometimes thought to be the
very limit of upper-class refinement or decadence, was more of
a middle-class than an aristocratic style" (411-12), but this is
certainly untrue for France. He declares that "The great man
of the baroque becomes the good man of the rococo, and
goodness is defined as domestic, as being a tender husband,
more often than not instructed by his more virtuous wife" (19;
see 32), but in France the typical social type of the preceding,
classical period was not "the great man," but the honnhe
homme, and the social type of the rococo is not the good man,
but the petit-maitre. Park's bourgeois, moralizing conception of
rococo society, while it may fit some English and German
rococo, certainly does not fit anywhere else, especially in France
or Italy.
He says of Clarissa: "Its bourgeois protagonist, its critique
of the aristocracy, its multiple points of view, its writing to the
moment, its domestic setting, its concern with minutiae—it is
the epic of miniaturization—all reveal its rococo identity as
well" (19). At least three of these six criteria (bourgeois, antiaristocratic, domestic) are not rococo but, on the contrary, antirococo-pre-Romantic.
Given this problem with English
literature, it is hardly surprising that his comments on the
French novels he considers are problematic. He classes them as
rococo if they have any rococo characteristics at all, even when
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these are far from predominant. Moreover, his reading of
Marivaux's theater shows that he has seriously misunderstood
him: "Here servants pretend to be aristocrats, and aristocrats
servants, a confusion made possible by the implicit understand
ing that their natures are not different" (88). On the contrary,
the premise of Marivaux's theater is the comic effect of each
class's true nature showing transparently through the other-class
disguise precisely because their natures are so very different.
Marivaux is fascinated by the variation in human nature as it is
manifested in a coachman, a laundress, a bourgeoise, as he
explicitly says in La Vie de Marianne.
Park calls his method ideological and sociological (18), but it
might be more to the point to say that the perspective is
historical rather than aesthetic, so that aesthetic features take
second place to historical dates in determining whether a work
is to be considered rococo. The reader should beware of the
outdated conception of the rococo that is presented in the text,
but this is an attractive book, and the author is clearly a man
of taste and erudition, to whom we owe a debt of gratitude for
producing it; I am sure it was a labor of love. Because of the
intelligent effort put into it and the visual excellence of the
result, I would certainly recommend it, although not without
some hesitation.
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Howard Lloyd Williams, ed., Essays on Kant's
Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992). Pp. xix + 331. $32.50.
Reviewed by Edward Joseph Katz
University of North Carolina at Asheville
. With the political landscape worldwide shaken by economic
recession and the resurgence of nationalism, Kant's political
ideas are perhaps more relevant now than at any time since the
advent of the Cold War. Howard Williams, the Kant scholar
and lecturer in political theory at the University College of
Wales, Aberystwyth, has collected thirteen essays devoted to the
study of Kantian political philosophy and its engagement with
modern moral and political thought. Six of the essays are
published here for the first time, and another appears with a
substantial postscript. The contributors come from Canada,
Europe, and the United States: the result is a fine balance of
approaches and perspectives applied to a broad range of
practical and theoretical concerns.
Williams's opening essay considers, with measured skepti
cism, the essential optimism of Kant's political thought,
grounded as it is in the Enlightenment insistence upon the
possibility of continued scientific, social, and moral progress.
Williams ai^ues that, in modern participatory democracy,
"Neither optimism nor pessimism are [sic] any longer necessary
standpoints, since history is no longer something...happening to
us from the outside" (13); history is, rather, a form of
interpretation, revealed in the operation of reflective judgment.
Still, Williams warns us that Kantian optimism holds the risk
of political martyrdom, a tragic heroism that threatens stasis in
practical politics.
Onora O'Neill extends the idea that the Kantian project lays
bare the recursive nature of critique and the constructedness of
reason. O'Neill demonstrates that, for Kant, reason's authority
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is based on a dialogic principle. Reason is founded on debate
and the sensus communis, which work together "to constrain
possibilities for acting and for cognition" within a given domain
of agents (79). Ernest Weinrib examines the complex formula
tion of Kant's universalist legalism, which conceives law as a
distinct mode of understanding that is informed by an internal
and coherent structure, as "a unity that can be articulated
through its doctrines and institutions" (17).
Several of the essays concern Kant's position on punishment
and freedom in a state governed according to republican
principles. For Otfried Hoffe, Kantian freedom legitimates
"coercion" whenever lapses in social behavior threaten the
existence of a community or social organization. Samuel
Fleischacker writes that we cannot assess the morality of
another's actions if to do so demands an empirical assessment
of the inner principles guiding an action, for such principles are
always opaque, even to agents themselves. In this view,
Fleischacker notes, "the entire order of justice symbolizes, is
indeed an appearance of, the pure moral order" (204). R. F.
Atkinson explores Kant's moral and political rigor in his
treatment of lying, rebellion, and punishment.
Two essays focus on freedom, inequality, and gender in
Kantian political thought. Susan Shell, in "Kant's Political
Cosmology," examines the relation between freedom and desire
in Kant's early work. Shell argues that, for Kant, the difficulty
of the human condition lies in man's "apparent indeterminacy,"
the anchor for which must be found not in the realm of
metaphysical absolutes, "but in the lesser, human whole that
Kant refers to as the 'moral world'" (83). Shell's treatment of
this search for determinacy derives from Kant's Observations
Concerning the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and, in
particular, from his ideas about taste as a means of achieving
unity out of the conflict between freedom and desire. Marriage,
Shell maintains, offers a transformative "principle of comple
mentarity" (95) through which it becomes a symbol of social
and moral order. Susan Mendus explores the ways in which.
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for Kant, women must always remain passive citizens, charging
him with "unthinking prejudice" in his views toward women
(181) and observing that individualistic thought ironically
implies an ethos of domination within a marriage. In her
postscript, however, Mendus contends that Kant establishes
criteria for self-mastery in social relations, which may be used
and defended by feminists.
Such considerations of Kant's view of the state and its
problematic relation to the political subject are particularly
welcome, especially in a time fraught with issues of political
responsibility and cooperation. Wolfgang Kersting treats what
he considers the six central doctrines and arguments in Kant's
philosophy of the state, which is grounded in pure practical
Reason and bears fruitfully upon participatory and partnershipbased legislative democracy (150-54). Peter Nicholson explores
the responsibilities of the individual with respect to the
problem of revolution, which Kant expressly forbids as illegal
and immoral despite his favorable comments on the French
Revolution. Especially interesting is Nicholson's discussion of
the contradictory claim that one must neither resist a sovereign
nor serve, on the orders of that sovereign, as agent of tyranny.
Roger Scruton is also interested in the individual in society,
though in politico-economic terms; Scruton derives from Kant's
Categorical Imperative a vision of social organization in which
individual identity is the product of objective and unalienated
self-realization within a community.
Steven Smith's "Defending Hegel from Kant" might have
made a fine introduction to the other contributions, for it
includes an excellent survey of the moral thought underlying
Kantian political philosophy. Most compelling is Smith's
examination of Hegel's conception of moral progress as the
tragic collision between valid moralities. Patrick Riley outlines
the limitations of Hannah Arendt's view that Kant's political
philosophy is most evident, though deeply embedded, in his
idea of generalized aesthetic judgment, as articulated in the
Critique of Judgment. Riley also examines Arendt's essay
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"Truth and Politics"—occasioned by the controversy following
her discussion of the "banality of evil" in Eichmann in
Jerusalem—2x16. contemplates several of the issues Nicholson
considers.
Specialists in political theory, history, and Kant studies will
certainly find Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy valuable for
the new material it brings to the field. To scholars in literature,
art criticism, and related disciplines, Williams's collection offers
a needed clarity to the oft-confused, always complex categories
of political thought.

Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments:
Reflections on Hume's Treatise (Cambridge and
London: Harvard LFniversity Press, 1991). Pp. xiv
+ 333. $39.95.
Reviewed by M. A. Box
University of Alaska^ Fairbanks
Baler's study makes an interesting contrast of approaches
with David Pears's Hume's System: An Examination of the First
Book of His Treatise (Oxford University Press, 1990). Though
both commentators profess to examine Hume's system and to
concentrate on the Treatise, Pears is really interested only in
Hume's "basic system," that is, his theory of mind and its
epistemological ramifications. Hence, he confines himself to
Book 1, while Baier sees Books 2 and 3 as important in
themselves and as modifications of the philosophy in Book 1.
Pears looks back on Hume with the questionable benefit of
Russellian and Wittgensteinian hindsight, diagnosing where
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Hume supposedly went wrong, whereas Baier is wary of
applying theories and terminology that Hume would not have
recognized. At the same time, Baier insists on distinguishing
Pears's tenets from their Hobbesian and Lockean predecessors.
She takes pains, for example, to show that he was neither a
utilitarian nor a contractarian.
Whereas Pears exemplifies in its full glory the old approach
of the analytic school, of which Hume was a forerunner, Baier
exemplifies an historical orientation, the first priority of which
is ascertaining accurately what Hume meant rather than making
progress on particular philosophical problems. Though Pears
is in greater danger of teleological distortion, Baier's approach
has its own danger—an imaginative identification with Hume
that invites blending of one's own preoccupations with Hume's.
Consider, for example, Baier's examination of Hume's
metaphoric habits; Baier notes a surprisingly unclinical cast of
mind in the great anatomist of human nature. The mutual
"attraction" of associated ideas is, for Baier's Hume, less a
Newtonian figure of speech evoking gravitational force than an
interpersonal one evoking animal magnetism (27). Extrapolat
ing a putative Humean theory of truth, Baier again suggests
that, for Hume, the epistemic sense of "true" is assimilated to
the interpersonal sense of "faithful" and "trustworthy" (287).
Initially, readers are taken aback by such venturesome readings;
then, they are startled by the extent to which they themselves
seem faithful to the Humean program.
Baier's thesis is that Hume's system reconstitutes "reason"
into "judgment" (or "socialized and sympathetic reason" [278]).
"Reason" is (i) demonstrative reasoning and (ii) inferential
reasoning "limited to fact-finding, fact-relating and fact-predict
ing" (279). It is the sort of cognition with which Pears
concerns himself. "Judgment," on the other hand, is a natural
virtue enabling us to act prudently, discreetly, cooperatively,
justly, morally. This reconstitution occurs incrementally over
the three books of the Treatise, with the notorious paroxysm of
neo-Pyrrhonism in Book 1 offered as an object lesson in the

Reviews

353

futility of "solitary intellectualist reason" (285). Whereas for
Pears book 1 is an attempt to lay a foundation, for Baier it is an
early step in a dialectic.
For Baier's Hume, a crucial test of successful discursive
thought is "reflexivity," the ability of a mode of thought to
"bear its own survey" {Treatise, 3.3.6, t6). A rationalist account
of mind cannot withstand its own scrutiny since, for one thing,
it must find that, consistently implemented, the mind would
sidetrack itself into estimating the probability of probability
estimates in infinitum (1.4.1). In contrast, Hume's causal
account of mind can point to causes both prompting the
estimates and retrieving the mind from them; we estimate
probabilities because we desire not to blunder, and we cease
estimating them because the mind cannot sustain cognitive
presence for ratiocination exceeding phenomena impinging on
consciousness, including (Baier stresses) the influence of other
people.
Whether the reflexivity principle be one that Hume held and
wielded, as Baier contends; whether it partakes of the passional,
moral, and social qualities of "judgment" more than of the
logical and inferential ones of "reason"; whether Hume
proffered "judgment" as a reconstructed reason are questions no
single scholarly study can settle. But this book should be read
widely, for, in addition to a daring thesis, it offers detailed
accounts of numerous difficult Humean arguments and serves
as a valuable companion to those working through the Treatise.
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